The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 And its Effects on American Business by Bergen, Lara
University of Massachusetts Boston
ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Financial Services Forum Publications Financial Services Forum
6-1-2005
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 And its Effects on
American Business
Lara Bergen
University of Massachusetts Boston
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/financialforum_pubs
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Occasional Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Financial Services Forum at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Financial Services Forum Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more
information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bergen, Lara, "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 And its Effects on American Business" (2005). Financial Services Forum Publications.
Paper 17.
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/financialforum_pubs/17
Financial Services Forum
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
And its Effects on American Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lara Bergen 
 
Financial Services Forum 
College of Management  
University of Massachusetts Boston 
June 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial Services Forum
 
 
 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and its Effects on American Businesses 
 
Lara Bergen 
 
June 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lara Bergen recently completed her Master's in Economics at Boston University.  She previously 
received her B.S. in Economics and minor in Mathematics at the University of Washington, and 
hails from Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.  She currently works in consulting at Spinnaker, LLC in 
Boston.   Lara has lived in China for six months prior to graduate school and Lara is looking to 
further her career in international finance or financial consulting with an emphasis on Asian 
markets.   
 
 
 
Financial Services Forum
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the wake of the 2001-2002 Arthur Andersen accounting scandal and collapse of Enron and 
WorldCom, the government, the investors and the American public demanded corporate reforms 
to prevent similar future occurrences.  Viewed to be largely a result of failed or poor governance, 
insufficient disclosure practices, and a lack of satisfactory internal controls, in 2002 Congress 
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act seeking to set standards and guarantee the accuracy of financial 
reports. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (known as SARBOX or SOX) sought to address these concerns through 
making executives responsible for company accounting statements, redefining the relationships 
between corporations and their auditors, and restructuring the internal audit systems of public 
corporations.  Since the implementation of the law, SOX has redefined the corporate accounting 
world.  It is widely viewed to be the most important piece of corporate governance and 
disclosure legislation since the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934.    
 
This paper first outlines the provisions of the SOX Act, analyze its implications for firms and 
investors, and then address some of the key external effects of the implementation of and 
compliance with the SOX Act. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, named after co-creators Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland and 
Representative Michael Oxley of Ohio, was passed in July 2002 in an attempt to restore investor 
confidence in corporate America following the multi-billion dollar accounting scandals at Enron 
and WorldCom.  The following section outlines key provisions of the SOX Act and details some 
of the objectives of each. 
 
The Act first establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB – hereafter 
referred to as the Board), which works jointly with the SEC to oversee auditors of public 
companies with a goal to “protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the 
preparation of informative, fair, and independent audit reports” (PCAOB, Our Mission).    The 
PCAOB operates under the same jurisdiction as the SEC and has the authority to discipline 
violators of the Act.    It sets out guidelines separating Board members from public accounting 
firms, and defines auditing, quality control, independence standards and rules, and disciplinary 
actions and procedures. 
 
Section two outlines the functions of auditors and clarifies their independence from their clients.   
Subsection 201 details which functions cannot be performed by public accounting firms 
contemporaneously with an audit, as an attempt to prevent conflicts of interest in firm 
accounting.    These functions include investment management, human resources services, 
services related to bookkeeping and financial statements, and actuarial services.   Exceptions can 
be approved by the Board and are made in cases where the revenue paid for such services 
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contributes less than 5% of revenues paid to the auditing firm.   Other sections outline audit 
partner rotations, accounting firm reporting procedures, and executive officer independence.   
Specifically, subsection 206 states that the CEO, Controller, CFO, Chief Accounting Officer or 
similarly positioned employees cannot have been employed by the company’s audit firm for one 
year prior to the audit.   
 
Section three defines corporate responsibility.  It first creates public company audit committees 
consisting of board members who cannot receive payments outside of service on the board.   It 
declares that executive officers must accompany their financial statements with a declaration 
certifying statement accuracy, with the knowledge that failure to include this document must be 
knowing and intentional to ensure liability.  It gives federal courts the authority to penalize 
executives who attempt to influence or manipulate financial statements by granting “any 
equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors” (AICPA, 2005). 
 
Section four details disclosure and internal audit procedures.  It prohibits loans to executives and 
presents a timeline for disclosure of executive/owner transactions.  Of particular note is 
Subsection 404 (hereafter referred to as Section 404), which requires “each annual report of an 
issuer to contain an ‘internal control report’” (AICPA, 2005).  This section has emerged as the 
most difficult and costly to implement, and consideration of its effects will constitute a large 
portion of this paper.  Requirements for the internal control report include the following: “(1) 
state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal 
control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and (2) contain an assessment, as of the 
end of the issuer’s fiscal year, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures 
of the issuer for financial reporting” (AICPA, 2005).  In addition, Section 404 requires each firm 
to disclose if its senior financial officers have or have not adopted a code of ethics and to present 
the contents of this code.   
 
The remainder of the Act outlines SEC responsibilities including minimum standards for 
practicing attorneys, requisites for conducting studies, an increase in monetary resources for 
implementation of the Act, authority to freeze payments, extension of whistleblower protections, 
and enhancement of white-collar fraud penalties.  In addition, it included a provision for a 
General Accounting Office (GAO) study analyzing the consolidation of public accounting firms 
since 1989. 
 
Effects of SOX Act on Public Companies 
 
The SOX Act has been viewed by some as a controversial reaction by Congress to investor and 
public outrage at deception by public companies, compounded by excessive compensation to 
executives (Bumgardner, 2003).  As a result, an expansive amount of literature focuses on 
analyzing the costs and benefits of the SOX Act to companies.  This section will look at the costs 
of implementation of the SOX Act, largely resulting from Section 404, to large, mid-, and small-
sized public companies.  In addition, it will look at some global trade issues resulting from the 
US law and external effects on accounting firms and the IT sector. 
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Factors affecting all firms 
 
Section 404 mandates creation of an internal control structure, and assessment of its 
effectiveness.  This control structure involves controls on internal financing reporting and 
auditing.  Implementing this control structure has proven more expensive than expected, with 
2004 SOX costs estimated to have risen 62% in July over January expectations, according to 
surveys of 224 public companies conducted by Financial Executives International.  These 
increases were largely due to internal costs, with a smaller jump in external costs and fees 
charged by external auditors (FEI, 2005).  A March 2005 follow-up to this survey found 217 
companies reporting a 39% increase in costs, due largely to increases in external costs for 
consulting and software, and in part due to increased fees from external auditors (FEI, 2005).  
The SEC estimates that companies will collectively spend 5.4 million staff hours each year 
complying with SOX, and AMR Research estimates that US companies will spend $6.1 billion 
this year for manpower, IT, and consulting services (CFO, 2004).  Much of the costs of 
implementing Section 404 may consist of sunk costs.  As a company designs and perfects its 
own individual control structure, it may incur many one-time expenses, but in the long term may 
gain efficiencies through improved financial reporting and a better ability to track internal 
expenses.   
 
SOX compliance is mandatory for public companies, and thus resources must be allocated to its 
implementation.  The diversion of these funds from other, potentially profitable endeavors may 
result in improper investments or risk mitigation that could result in a loss of value or innovation 
to firms.  Firms also lose productivity with the necessity of allocating manpower to compliance 
instead of profitable activity.  Many CEOs have had to divert energy from strategic decision-
making to reviewing accounts and travel between locations to check control structure 
arrangements.  Some of the financial resources required to implement SOX cannot be included in 
returns on investment (ROI) calculations of the firm.  For example, information technology 
resources and software used to improve efficiency and thus improve financial reporting may not 
necessarily be included in the ROI of SOX, given the efficiency improvement motivator.  Thus, 
in meeting ROI targets, SOX may fall short of acceptable levels or may have no “returns” at all.   
 
Many larger, forward-looking firms view SOX as an opportunity to streamline their internal 
structure through taking advantage of new software designed to improve networking of company 
resources and information.  This software has improved the security of information in many 
firms, and implementation has discovered loopholes and areas for improvement within the 
companies.  Other companies are struggling to keep up, however, especially mid-sized and small 
companies.   
 
Small and mid-sized public companies  
 
Mid-sized and small public companies have incurred relatively larger costs in implementing 
SOX.  Given that the professional costs and managerial time varies little with company size, 
small and mid-sized companies must allocate a higher percentage of revenue to SOX compliance 
(Morgenstern and Nealis, 2004).  Many of these firms have considered such measures as reverse 
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stock splits to shrink the company to a size below that required to meet SOX’s strictest 
requirements, or have considered delisting the company.   
 
According to a Wharton School study, delisting of public companies tripled in 2003 from 2002 
(Leuz, et, al., 2004).  This act of becoming a private company may be an attempt to save money 
or to avoid public scrutiny through the SOX Act.  The Wharton study found that most companies 
de-listed their shares in an attempt to avoid the high costs of complying with the SOX Act, with 
some smaller companies listing costs of as high as $500,000 to comply (AP, 2004).  Some 
companies, however, de-listed to avoid outside monitoring and scrutiny, leading the study’s 
authors to suspect that firms were not being managed in the most efficient way or that their 
compensation was excessive (AP, 2004).  The study found that some of the firms with “higher 
free cash flow and lower-quality accounting” were more likely to “go dark” – to deregister from 
the SEC and become private firms (AP, 2004). 
 
Independence of board members may also place hardships on smaller companies.  Many publicly 
listed small companies have few board members, and the chief financial officer may act in the 
capacity of other positions.  Smaller firms may not have the resources necessary to recruit 
qualified individuals to meet independence requirements. 
 
The SEC has made moves to attempt to alleviate some difficulties faced by small and mid-sized 
firms.  A one-year extension for reporting controls was given to corporations with assets of $75 
million or less.  In mid-December, 2004, the SEC announced the establishment of an advisory 
committee to assess the effects of SOX and securities laws on smaller public companies, with the 
objective of making recommendations for change.   
 
SEC and PCAOB Recommendations 
 
Since the passage of SOX, the Board and the SEC have attempted to address high costs incurred 
in SOX compliance by suggesting that auditors tailor their audit procedures to the needs of each 
company, and thus try to combine their overall audit with the internal audits completed through 
the control structure to reduce duplication of services.  They have suggested that more discretion 
be used in evaluating which controls to focus on in detail, and to try to identify those areas that 
might have difficulties in advance of audits.  In addition, they suggest companies consult with 
auditors in establishing a functional control structure prior to attempts at implementation.  
Documentation and testing of information technology internal controls have also been reduced to 
only general IT controls in addition to financial-related systems, to ensure reliable financial 
information while reducing the number of controls necessary. 
 
Global Trade Effect 
 
Very little focus has been placed on effects of SOX compliance on global trade.  SOX requires 
companies involved in international trade to establish controls for import-export operations and 
global supply chains.  These management processes must be published in annual and quarterly 
reports to investors.  In addition, companies have to report their efforts to “identify, assess and 
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respond to risk such as terrorist attacks” (Field, 2004).  These requirements do not supersede 
existing laws enforced by agencies such as Customs and Border Protection, the Department of 
Commerce and the Food and Drug Administration.  However, wrongful declarations and errors 
in valuations of imports/exports will face legal action under SOX as well as customs agencies.   
 
Another key implication for international trade is the requirement by SOX of disclosure of all 
off-balance sheet transactions, obligations and arrangements, with failure to comply resulting in 
delisting by the SEC or barring of international trade.  Many firms have low international trade 
volumes, and as such may know very little about their customs compliance.  SOX requirements 
present yet another hurdle for international trade compliance. 
 
Power to the Big Four and the IT Sector 
 
Following the collapse of Arthur Andersen, the main auditing and accounting firms became four: 
Deloitte, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young.  The dominance of these firms 
and their experience in SOX-compliant auditing has allowed them to charge potentially inflated 
fees for their services, and the GAO study mandated by the SOX Act concluded that smaller 
firms faced significant barriers to entry (Economist, 2005).  Smaller accounting firms have seen 
advantages, however, benefiting from conflict-of-interest laws that prevent larger firms from 
continuing some of their non-audit work.  Many law firms have also seen increases in consulting 
work through provision of compliance assistance.   
 
Additionally, compliance with SOX requires computer technology to integrate and maintain 
accurate information, networks, and databases.  Many IT companies have seen their profits 
increase as they have developed software to assist in SOX compliance that needs installation and 
consulting support. 
   
Implications of the Act for Investors 
 
Co-creator Rep, Michael Oxley stated: “The average investor does feel that they are being 
treated more fairly now and the bad guys are being punished for wrecking their faith in those 
publicly traded corporations.  Yes, there is something psychological about seeing some CEOs 
and top corporate execs doing the perp walk.  I think that has a certain effect on the average 
investor” (Business Wire, 2004).  While research in the field of behavioral finance and the 
effects of investor sentiment are still relatively new, prospect theory suggests that people are 
“easily influenced by framing, that is the context and ambience that accompany the decision 
problem” (Cowles Foundation, 2005).  Empirically evaluating effects of the accounting scandals 
on investor sentiment is difficult, however.  Share price declines from January 1st, 2001 to June 
26th, 2002 of Enron (99.9% decline), Global Crossing (99.7%) and WorldCom (93.8%) 
following major accounting scandals indicate a strongly negative effect of “fiddling accounts” 
(Economist, 2002).  Contagion effects, where investors view firms directly and indirectly 
connected to an accounting scandal negatively, also played a role.  Termed “Enronitis,” this 
contagion not only affected firms with direct ties to Enron, they had a wide market effect on 
firms ranging from General Electric to Rolls Royce (Arnold, 2002).  Clearly, investor sentiment 
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was not only expressed as public outrage, but also affected the valuation of public firms and the 
US stock market, thus creating a need to improve investor sentiments and maintain confidence in 
the US financial markets. 
 
The SOX Act was created as an attempt to prevent fraudulent behavior in financial statements, 
and as such one must first consider motivators for fraud.  Pressure to perform, expectations 
placed on executives by analysts, and compensation factors such as stocks that, in theory, 
increase in value as a company’s performance improves, all can serve as motivators to act in 
manners that would make the company appear financially more attractive.  Both common sense 
and empirical evidence (Ross, 2005) indicate that positive earnings shocks will positively affect 
stock returns, thus increasing the impetus to state positive earnings when compensation is tied to 
stock value.  The provisions of the SOX Act requiring executive accountability for financial 
statements and increasing penalties for white-collar crime are designed to provide motivation for 
executives to enforce accuracy in their financial reporting.  In addition, the internal control 
structure created in Subsection 404 mandates a framework for accounting standards from the 
individual level, thus restricting opportunities to commit fraud and preventing compounding 
effects from the individual level. 
 
The implementation of a code of ethics strengthens anti-fraud objectives by encouraging a 
standard of ethical reporting at the individual level, thus furthering the motivation to prevent 
minor accounting errors that may result in large scale fiscal errors.  Statements of adherence or 
waiving of the code of ethics, as well as public disclosure of the contents of such agreements, 
allows investors to observe the motivations of the firms in their accounting practices.   
 
Board independence provides additional safeguards against fraud risk.   In the SEC’s Final Rule 
on the Act, it recognized this importance: “strengthening auditor independence should provide 
investors with more confidence that the accountants are playing their ‘gatekeeper’ role related to 
companies' financial reporting and provide further assurance that the financial condition, results 
of operations, and cash flows of companies are fairly reflected in their financial reports thereby 
allowing public companies less costly access to the capital markets.” (SEC, Final Rule) 
 
Risk management, reduced fraud risk, enhanced governance, and strengthened controls as a 
result of implementation of the SOX Act all provide somewhat intangible benefits to investors.  
Given the dependence of the US economy on its financial markets, however, and the jobs created 
and maintained through the financial sector, maintenance of a strong financial sector is vital for 
the US economy and the well-being and standard of living of its citizenship.  If strengthening of 
investor confidence through improved accuracy and accountability of public companies reflects 
positively on the US economy, the intangible benefits may outweigh the calculable costs to 
public corporations of compliance with SOX. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A plethora of literature disparaging the effects of the SOX Act has been circulating since the 
Act’s passage.  A majority of this discourse focuses on the costs of implementing Section 404’s 
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internal control structure, and very little addresses potential benefits to investors.  This may be 
due to the intangibility of investor benefits and the lack of conclusiveness in behavioral finance 
analyses.  Implementation of the legislation is still in its infancy and creation of a functional and 
efficient control structure will likely take time to complete.  An effectual controls system may 
simplify accounting decisions by presenting accurate and complete profit and cost statements 
that otherwise may have been more discretionary and based on broader, less informed accounting 
assessments.  The creation and adherence to a code of ethics may improve efficiency of financial 
data collection, resulting in lower costs of financial restatements and auditing research.   
 
Costs to firms may prove prohibitory, however, and the results of the SEC’s investigations of the 
effects of securities laws and SOX on small public companies will be interesting in this context.  
The postponement or reconsideration of investments due to reallocation of resources to SOX 
compliance may result in less risk taking on the part of management, which could have the result 
of repressing potential growth and innovation.  Increased legislation may be viewed by 
companies and investors alike as signaling more government interaction in financial markets, a 
result that may have unforeseen negative results, such as capital outflow and further outsourcing 
of US business functions. 
 
The SOX Act has both positive and negative current and potential effects.  Full evaluation of the 
Act at this juncture is likely premature, however, and further analysis and time will be needed to 
determine if this “reactionary” Congressional Act has a predominating positive effect of 
increased investor confidence in the market or a prohibitory cost that results in lowered 
productivity of public companies and dilution of the dominant US financial services market. 
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